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Modern macroeconomic theory teaches us new lessons about exchange 
rates: Currency depreciations or appreciations that change the relative 
competitiveness of producers in different countries are undesirable from 
a global perspective if they lead to relative prices that do not reflect the 
true relative costs of production. From this standpoint, “external balance” 
does not mean that trade balances should be zero, but rather that global 
resources are allocated efficiently. The implications of this insight for the 
role of the exchange rate in monetary policy are explored here. Some of 
the traditional arguments for purely floating exchange rates are challenged 
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and comments on the role of international reserves.
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debate has continued over many years on the desirable degree of for-
eign exchange rate flexibility. One side of the debate has sometimes 
made the case that the exchange rate should be freely determined by mar-
ket forces, independently of any foreign exchange intervention or targeting 
by central bank monetary policy. This argument takes the stance that the 
market can best determine the appropriate level of the exchange rate.
From the standpoint of modern macroeconomics, particularly from 
the view of New Keynesian economics, that stance is potentially self-
contradictory. Markets are able to achieve efficient, welfare-maximizing 
outcomes when they operate without distortions—that is, when markets 
are competitive and prices adjust instantly to reflect underlying costs. But 
in such a world, the nominal exchange rate regime is of no consequence in 
determining the real allocation of resources. The real exchange rate (the 
consumer price level in one country compared with the level in another 
country, expressed in a common currency) and the terms of trade (the 
price of a country’s imports relative to its exports) could adjust freely to 
efficient levels under a floating nominal exchange rate regime, a managed 
float, or even a fixed exchange rate regime if goods markets were perfectly 
efficient. Nominal prices could respond to market pressures even if the 
nominal exchange rate does not. In a world of perfect markets, relative 
prices can allocate resources efficiently independently of the determination 
of any nominal prices or the nominal exchange rate.
If the nominal exchange rate regime matters for the determination 
of relative prices such as the real exchange rate or the terms of trade, it 
must matter because there is some kind of nominal price stickiness. For 
example, if the U.S. dollar/euro exchange rate is to affect any real prices, 
it must be because there are some nominal prices that are sticky in dollar 
terms and others that are sticky in euros. From the standpoint of modern 
macroeconomics, the question should be posed: What policy best deals 
with the distortions—from sticky prices and other sources? Is it a fully 
flexible exchange rate, or some sort of exchange rate targeting? Moreover, 
the relevance of an exchange rate policy is only for the “short run.” Once 
enough time has passed for nominal prices to adjust to any economic 
imbalances, the nominal exchange rate regime is irrelevant—the nominal 
price adjustments can bear the load of relative price changes without any 
help from the exchange rate.
The political case for fully flexible exchange rates is sometimes made 
to rest on the notion that floating exchange rates can achieve “external 
balance.” External balance is an ill-defined term, but usually what its pro-
ponents mean is trade balance or current account balance. Sometimes the 
term refers to “sustainable external balances,” another vaguely defined 
term. What is clear is that the proponents of this point of view believe 
that floating exchange rates will eliminate large current account deficits 
or surpluses.
However, there is very little empirical support for this notion. The 
idea probably is not based on experience, but instead on open-economy 
models of the 1950s and 1960s that assumed the exchange rate would ad-
just to eliminate trade imbalances if it were freely floating. 
I will discuss the evidence on the role of exchange rates in achieving 
trade balance. In fact, exchange rate adjustment may have a modest ef-














































claim is not firmly established in the evidence. It is important to recognize 
that evidence on the long-run effects of the terms of trade on imports and 
exports is not particularly relevant to the issue of which nominal exchange 
rate regime is appropriate. The nominal exchange rate regime only mat-
ters—only can influence real prices—at the horizon of price adjustment. 
Once enough time has passed for nominal prices to adjust, relative price 
changes can occur under any nominal exchange rate regime.
The second point relates to the notion of external balance. A current 
account deficit or surplus does not necessarily represent any inefficient 
outcome in financial markets. The current account is not only the coun-
try’s trade balance (with the addition of net foreign asset returns), but it 
is also the difference between the nation’s total saving and its investment 
in capital goods. It is natural for some countries to borrow to finance in-
vestment, or in some cases, consumption. 
Instead, I will discuss a different notion of external imbalance—an 
imbalance in the level of the exchange rate. If global markets allocate 
resources efficiently, then prices should reflect underlying resource costs 
(costs of labor, technology levels, efficiency in production, etc.). The com-
petitiveness of firms should not depend on the nominal exchange rate. A 
currency is misaligned when the exchange rate moves to a level where a 
country’s competitiveness in world markets is altered. I will discuss how 
currency misalignments can be inefficient even though exchange rates do 
not have large short-run effects on trade balances.
The modern Keynesian literature makes the case that the exchange 
rate may rightly be a target of monetary policy, along with domestic goals 
such as inflation and the output gap. Exchange rates do not automatically 
settle at a level that eliminates external imbalance as I have just defined 
it. Exchange rates are asset prices that are driven not only by current eco-
nomic considerations, but by news about the future (and possible market 
sentiment or bubbles). Markets cannot reliably deliver external balance 
when there are distortions such as nominal price stickiness, so it may be 
desirable to consider exchange rate objectives in determining monetary 
policy.  
However, any country acting on its own has an incentive to manipu-
late its currency—perhaps depreciating it to enhance the competitiveness 
of its own firms. There is a case for monetary policy coordination on broad 
currency targets. 
I then turn to two issues that are of special interest to emerging mar-
kets. First is the determination of the exchange rate target. Even among 
advanced economies that have similar production structures, it is difficult 
to pinpoint the exchange rate that eliminates currency misalignment (just 
as it is difficult, for example, to determine the “full-employment” level of 
unemployment). But the task is much harder for the exchange rate of an 
emerging market relative to a high-income country. To some extent, as I 
will discuss, the problem is one of data limitations.
The second important point is credibility of monetary policy. Coun-
tries with a history of high inflation may find it difficult to undertake 
reform of monetary policy. One very visible way of establishing central 
bank credibility is to fix the nominal exchange rate fully. Policymakers in 
this situation face a trade-off: The cost of this quick route to credibility 














































change rate can leave the country with an inflation rate that differs from 
the target that a fully credible central bank would desire, and fixing the 
exchange rate can sometimes make it more difficult to achieve a target for 
the output gap.
Finally, I briefly review special questions that arise under sterilized 
intervention,  when  the  policymaker  can  target  the  exchange  rate  but 
still leave some room for other monetary policy objectives. The evidence 
strongly suggests that sterilized intervention can only be effectively used 
when private capital markets are unable to offset the effects of the inter-
vention. This can occur when the government imposes controls on private 
flows of capital or when a country’s private capital markets are not deep 
enough to compete with large-scale intervention by central banks.
A country undertaking general economic liberalization may find it 
desirable to keep capital controls in place until internal markets are suf-
ficiently liberalized—this is a well-known conventional argument. During 
the period in which capital controls are effective, the central bank has the 
luxury of determining exchange rate policy somewhat independently of 
monetary policy.
But there are three dangers. First, if exchange rate policy is divorced 
from monetary policy, then stabilizing the exchange rate may not earn any 
credibility for monetary policy (though perhaps it does lend credibility for 
the overall stability of economic policy). Second, policymakers are par-
ticularly vulnerable to the charge of “currency manipulation.” If internal 
nominal prices can be set by monetary policy, and the nominal exchange 
rate can be set separately by sterilized intervention, then the policymaker 
may be able to influence real external prices for a long period of time. 
This exposes the country to the charge that its external competitiveness 
is determined by monetary and exchange rate policy, rather than by its 
underlying comparative advantage. Third, a policy of sterilized interven-
tion requires a policy regarding foreign currency reserves.
The contentious issue of management of foreign currency reserves is 
far too complex for me to address in this paper. I will briefly touch on 
three points. First, while it was commonly argued before the recent global 
financial crisis that many Asian countries were wasting resources in ac-
cumulating large foreign currency reserves, it has been widely noted that 
countries with large reserves fared relatively well during the crisis. Second, 
the odd thing about the crisis was that even though it originated primar-
ily in the U.S. financial sector, the immediate effect of the crisis was to 
strengthen the dollar. The logic is that holders of dollar assets were un-
willing to sell them, so there was a worldwide shortage of dollars. In this 
case, at least, it is dollar reserves that protected some countries—SDRs 
or euros would not have been as useful. Third, the willingness of the Fed-
eral Reserve to extend swaps to central banks around the world perhaps 
requires us to reexamine the need for foreign exchange reserves as a buffer 
in times of crisis.
This paper really is an opinionated survey of current research on ex-
change rate policy, but it does not offer a specific recipe for policymakers. 
Instead, the single most important point is that there is a strong case with 
firm analytical foundations for policy to manage fluctuations in exchange 














































that allows a fully flexible exchange rate with complete hands-off by poli-
cymakers will deliver an efficient market outcome.
1. THE EXCHANGE RATE AND CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
If exporters set prices in their own currency, and there is nominal 
price stickiness, then exchange rate movements will alter a country’s terms 
of trade. For example, consider a world of two countries—Europe and 
the U.S. If European exporters set prices in euros, PE X ,
€ (the subscript E 
refers to Europe, X refers to export prices, and the superscript refers to 




is directly influenced in the short run by the dollar per euro exchange 
rate, S
$/€. Likewise, if U.S. exporters set their prices in dollars, P U X ,
$ , then 
the euro price of European imports, P S U X ,
$/ /
$ € , moves inversely with the 
exchange rate. A dollar depreciation (an increase in S
$/€) directly and in-
stantaneously raises the price of imports in the U.S. and lowers the price 
of imports in Europe. If the elasticity of demand for imports is sufficiently 
high, and all other influences on the trade balance are held constant, then 
a depreciation of the dollar should raise the U.S. trade balance. Its exports 
should increase relative to its imports.
Alternatively, consider a small open economy. That country may have 
no influence on the world prices of traded goods. For example, Korea 
(which is not so small, but perhaps too small to set prices of traded goods) 
may compete in a world in which all traded goods prices are set in dol-
lars. It imports goods from the U.S. that are priced in dollars, and when 
it exports to the U.S., it must price in dollars. The level of the dollar/won 
exchange rate would not influence Korea’s terms of trade in the short run 
because both prices are set in dollars. But prices of nontraded goods and 
services in Korea are set in won and sticky in won terms in the short run. 
A depreciation of the won relative to the dollar, according to this analy-
sis, should increase the price of traded goods relative to nontraded goods 
within Korea. We might then expect that a depreciation of the won would 
switch demand toward Korean nontraded goods and away from traded 
goods. Potentially, this depreciation could improve the Korean trade bal-
ance if it leads to a decline in imports. The depreciation may also induce 
an expansion of Korea’s export industry. As the won prices of exports 
increase, resources will move into Korea’s export industries. (In contrast 
to the example of U.S. and Europe in the previous paragraph, this type of 
analysis assumes that Korea is a small enough force in world markets that 
it can increase its supply of exports to the world without any reduction in 
its export price.)
These theories imply that currency depreciations should improve trade 
balances for large and small economies. But the economic evidence is not 
so encouraging. First, it should be noted that it is very difficult to assess 
the effect of exchange rates on trade balances. There are few if any cases 
of “exogenous” changes in the exchange rate. The econometrician cannot 
perform a controlled experiment, depreciating a currency and then gaug-
ing its effect on trade. Instead, any comovements between exchange rates 
and trade quantities are confounded by the forces that cause the exchange 














































that a country with a trade deficit will experience a depreciation, and the 
depreciation will help to eliminate the trade deficit. But then it is hard 
econometrically to separate out the effect of the depreciation on the trade 
balance and the effect of the trade balance on the depreciation.
Empirical studies that have undertaken the challenge have tended to 
find a very low response of trade to exchange rate changes. The elastic-
ity of import demand with respect to exchange rates in the short run is 
frequently found to be in the inelastic range—below one.1 Exchange rate 
movements will not have a large effect on the trade balance in the short 
run. Or put another way, if we were to rely on the exchange rate alone to 
equilibrate large imbalances, the exchange rate change required may be 
very large.2
Again, I will emphasize that the relevant statistic we are trying to 
measure is the short-run elasticity of demand—the adjustment that can 
occur in response to the exchange rate at business-cycle frequencies. Take 





$ , may 
over the course of several years have a relatively large influence on imports 
and exports. Some estimates from the international trade literature put 
the elasticity of import demand as high as six or eight or even larger.3 But 
those long-run effects occur over a period of time when nominal prices 
should have had time to adjust. Even with the nominal exchange rate, S
$/€ ,
fixed, the terms of trade can increase if either P E X ,
€  rises or P U X ,
$  falls. 
Moreover, it is mistaken to conclude that the terms of trade can adjust 
under a fixed exchange rate only with a general inflation in one country or 
a general deflation in another. If the prices of goods that a country exports 
rise over time, general price stability is still attainable. Other components 
of the consumer price index—prices of nontraded goods and services, and 
prices of imported goods—may fall. Over long periods of time, countries 
with relatively stable overall prices, such as the U.S., still find some pric-
es—such as food and electronics—falling while other prices rise.
Given the difficulties with measuring the impact of exchange rate 
changes on import demand, perhaps of more interest is the recent study 
by Chinn and Wei (2008) that directly addresses the question of whether 
the exchange rate regime matters for current account adjustment. They 
examine the speed of adjustment of current account imbalances in 171 
countries, using annual data in the 1971–2005 period. They measure the 
persistence of current account imbalances by the speed at which the cur-
rent account returns to its long-run average. They classify countries by 
exchange rate regime: floating, fixed, and intermediate regimes according 
to the system developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). The study finds 
that there is no strong or robust relationship between the exchange rate 
regime and the speed of adjustment.
The first two paragraphs of this section laid out the traditional models 
of why a depreciation should improve the country’s current account bal-
1 For example, see Rose and Yellen (1989); Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez (2000); 
Chinn (2004); Chinn and Lee (2009); and Lee and Chinn (2006). Also see Reinert and 
Roland-Holst (1992), Blonigen and Wilson (1999), and Heathcote and Perri (2002).
2 See, for example, the calculations in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b, 2005, 2007).
3 See, for example, Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995), Head and Ries (2001), Lai and 














































ance. The advocates of purely flexible exchange rates believe that a coun-
try with a large trade deficit will experience a nominal depreciation that 
will play a significant role in equilibrating the trade balance. Why does the 
evidence not support this view?
There are two main problems. First, the economic behavior described 
in these two paragraphs is not consistent with actual economic behavior. 
Second, the underlying presumption that exchange rates move to elimi-
nate trade balances is not well grounded in theory and defies common 
sense observation.
In terms of the economic behavior, there are three differences between 
the traditional “models” (based on the 1960s-style analysis) described 
in the first two paragraphs and reality. First, it is well understood that 
short-run elasticities of import demand can be low. Because of the costs of 
doing international trade, import contracts are often written with signifi-
cant lead times. It is difficult to cancel contracts in the short run if there 
are adverse exchange rate movements. Moreover, a large quantity of non-
oil trade among advanced economies—perhaps two-thirds—is in durable 
consumer and capital goods.4 Even if firms and households immediately 
adjust their desired stock durables in response to price changes, the ag-
gregate accumulation or decumulation of these stocks occurs gradually 
over time due to the costs of adjusting durable stocks. Indeed, as I have 
already noted, long-run import demand elasticities are estimated to be 
much higher than short-run elasticities.
Second, there is now a large body of empirical evidence of pricing to 
market and low pass-through of exchange rates to prices. Contrary to the 
analysis above, prices of imported goods do not change very much in the 
short run in response to exchange rate changes. The U.S. price of imported 
goods from Europe is sticky in U.S. dollars. As the dollar/euro exchange 
rate changes, the dollar price of imported goods changes very little in the 
short run. This type of price stickiness leads automatically to pricing to 
market. If the price of a European good is set in euros when it is sold in 
Europe and dollars when it is sold in the U.S., then the price of the good 
in U.S. markets in dollar terms can deviate from the (dollar) price in Eu-
ropean markets.5
Using the example in the first paragraph of this section, the euro price 
of the European good sold within Europe, PE C ,
€ (the subscript C refers to 
the consumer price, as distinct from the export price), is sticky in the short 
run. The dollar price of the European export, PE X ,
$ , tends to be sticky also. 
The price in the U.S. of European goods, PE X ,
$ , does not fluctuate with 
the exchange rate and therefore does not move closely with the price in 




It is important to recognize that consumer prices of imported goods 
are particularly nonresponsive to exchange rates. There is a large empiri-
4 See Engel and Wang (2008).
5 My own work is among the earliest to emphasize the nonresponsiveness of consumer 
prices to exchange rates and the deviations from the law of one price. See Engel (1993, 1999) 
and Engel and Rogers (1996). See also, for example, Parsley and Wei (2001). A great deal 
of subsequent analysis supports these findings. See, for example, these very recent papers: 
Gopinath and Rigobon (2008), Gopinath, Itskhoki, and Rigobon (forthcoming), Burstein and 














































cal literature that looks at the currency of invoicing of exports and the 
price of imports at the dock. There is mixed evidence on the measurement 
of pass-through of exchange rates directly to import prices. While U.S. 
import prices are not very responsive to exchange rate changes, there 
is more responsiveness in other countries—particularly smaller countries. 
But that pass-through does not continue on to the prices paid by final us-
ers. The consumer prices, even in smaller countries, are not so responsive 
to exchange rates. Apparently, the distributors and retailers that take the 
good from the dock and bring it to the consumer absorb the effects of ex-
change rate changes. Prices paid by the final user are not very responsive 
to the exchange rate, which implies that demand for imports will not be 
very responsive to exchange rates unless the distributor/retailer is able to 
change sources (from other exporting countries or from internal produc-
ers) as the exchange rate changes.6
A third consideration that might explain why current account bal-
ances overall—rather than imports per se—are not very responsive to 
exchange rates is that many export goods are produced using imported 
intermediate goods. A depreciation may increase the price of imported 
goods, but if those goods are inputs into the export sector, the coun-
try’s competitiveness may not be strongly affected. Putting together these 
three elements—low short-run elasticities, low pass-through, and import-
ed intermediate goods—into a macroeconomic model calibrated to match 
Asian economies, Devereux and Genberg (2007) conclude that a deprecia-
tion of the currency will have little effect (and possibly perverse effects) 
on the current account balance.
It is equally important to note that there is no strong economic ra-
tionale for the case that exchange rates should move to eliminate trade 
imbalances. The textbook models of the 1960s defined external balance 
as a zero balance in trade in goods and services or a zero current account 
balance. But subsequent developments in economic thinking—the logic of 
economic models developed in the past forty years—have tended to em-
phasize the weaknesses in this notion of external balance.
It is a matter of simple accounting identities that a country’s cur-
rent account balance equals the difference between national saving and 
investment in capital goods. National saving in turn is the sum of private 
saving (household plus corporate saving) and government saving (taxes 
less government spending on goods and services). In the first place, the 
economic link is weak between exchange rates on the one hand and saving 
and investment on the other hand. Saving and investment are much more 
strongly determined by other economic variables, particularly the level of 
GDP and expected future growth rates, than they are by real exchange 
rates. 
Moreover, it may be an efficient global equilibrium for some countries 
to run current account deficits and others to run surpluses. Global “bal-
ance” does not mean that current accounts need to be balanced. Efficient 
global capital markets will reallocate funds from countries whose saving 
exceeds their internal investment needs to those that desire to borrow to 
finance current consumption and investment.














































This is not to say that international capital markets are, in fact, 
efficient. There is a strong case to be made that capital markets failed 
badly, especially in the U.S., in the run-up to the crisis. Lenders, and the 
financial system as a whole, did not adequately provision for the riskiness 
of their loans. There was too much borrowing in the U.S., and that surely 
contributed to the large U.S. current account deficit.
But exchange rates are not primarily determined by the current im-
balance between imports and exports or between output and expenditure. 
Exchange rates are asset prices—the price of one currency in terms of an-
other. Like any asset price, they are forward looking. They are determined 
not only by current economic “fundamentals,” but also and primarily by 
expectations of future fundamentals. This has been standard economic 
theory since the late 1970s, when the so-called asset market approach to 
exchange rates was developed. But somehow, the policy implications have 
been ignored. By this, I mean simply that if exchange rates are forward-
looking asset prices, then equilibrium in foreign exchange markets is not 
reached when the trade balance is zero.
Put another way, if foreign exchange were traded only to finance im-
ports, then the demand for foreign exchange would be determined by the 
demand for imports. Foreign demand for domestic currency would then 
equilibrate with domestic demand for foreign currency when trade was in 
balance. But casual observation tells us that only a very tiny fraction of 
foreign exchange trade is generated by import demand. Instead, foreign 
exchange trade is almost entirely for hedging and speculation purposes. 
The equilibrium in the foreign exchange market is not determined by 
trade balance. Instead, the foreign exchange rate will be determined as 
the expected present discounted value of current and future economic 
fundamentals.7
Before turning to a new perspective on external balance, I want to 
address briefly a different channel through which recent literature has sug-
gested the exchange rate may equilibrate external imbalances. Gourinchas 
and Rey (2007a) have noted that the net external position of a country—
its net indebtedness—depends not only on the accumulation of its past 
borrowing, but also on the valuation of that debt. A country may have 
borrowed extensively in the past, but if the debt has fallen in value, the 
country’s net debt to the rest of the world may be substantially less than 
its accumulated borrowing.
Put another way, a country can afford borrowing and debt if valuation 
changes work to its advantage. The U.S. has been a net borrower from the 
rest of the world for most of the past four decades. But, Gourinchas and 
Rey argue, the U.S. debt position may be sustainable if, as the country ac-
cumulates debt, the value of the debt deteriorates. In particular, since the 
U.S. is able to borrow in dollar-denominated debt, the foreign-currency 
value of its debt will fall when the dollar depreciates. Gourinchas and 
Rey present evidence that, indeed, in periods in which U.S. debt has risen 
substantially, the dollar has tended to depreciate. Valuation effects have 
worked as a mechanism of adjustment.
7 A recent extensive examination of the exchange rate from an asset market perspective 














































It is not clear whether this mechanism works for other countries or 
whether the empirical relationship is very robust for the U.S.8 But even 
if it is true that in the past the U.S. has successfully relied on valuation 
changes to ease adjustment in its financial position, it is unlikely that 
many countries could rely on this channel of adjustment. If we expect a 
country’s currency to depreciate, then borrowers should incorporate that 
expectation into asset prices. Countries that lend to the U.S. in dollar 
terms should require a higher nominal interest rate on U.S. debt to com-
pensate for this expected depreciation. This outcome is mitigated substan-
tially only if U.S. dollar-denominated debt is considered to be a very good 
“safe haven.” Then foreigners are willing to accept a lower expected return 
on U.S. debt, so that the expected depreciation of their dollar assets is an 
acceptable cost for holding such a safe asset. 
But not many countries can enjoy this safe haven privilege. Most 
countries borrow externally in debt denominated not in their own cur-
rency, but in foreign currency. Gourinchas and Rey (2007b) have used the 
term “exorbitant privilege” to describe the ability of the U.S. to borrow 
in its own currency, potentially at a lower expected rate of return than 
other countries.9 
Finally, on this point, economic logic suggests that a country can en-
joy the safe haven privilege even if it had a fixed exchange rate. Under a 
fixed exchange rate system, the safe haven currency would simply have a 
lower interest rate or higher face value to reflect its value as a safe haven. 
The point here is that “valuation effects” do not just operate through the 
exchange rate, but through the price of the underlying assets as well.
2. CURRENCY MISALIGNMENT
Modern Keynesian macroeconomics follows the general theme that 
policy—especially monetary policy—should be aimed at correcting or at 
least combating economic inefficiencies. In particular, monetary policy is 
particularly useful in working to offset short-run sticky price distortions.
In the open-economy setting, sticky prices can lead to currency mis-
alignments if they cause international prices to deviate from their underly-
ing resource costs. Prices allocate goods efficiently when the relative price 
of goods reflects the relative marginal costs for producing those goods (the 
marginal rate of transformation). Moreover, the prices paid by different 
consumers should differ only because the costs of delivering the goods to 
the consumers may differ. The efficient equilibrium requires that the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between any two goods for any household should 
equal the relative marginal costs of those goods (inclusive of the costs of 
distributing the goods to households).
When goods prices are sticky, short-run changes in exchange rates 
8 See, for example, Curcuru, Dvorak, and Warnock (2008, forthcoming).
9 Curcuru, Dvorak, and Warnock (2008, forthcoming) argue that, in fact, there is no 
exorbitant privilege. They find instead that to the extent the U.S. is able to earn higher 
returns on its foreign investments than foreigners earn on U.S. investments, it is attributable 
both to the mix of assets in the portfolios (U.S. investments abroad are in riskier assets) and 
poor investment timing by foreigners in U.S. assets. Devereux and Sutherland (forthcoming) 
cast doubt from a theoretical perspective on whether valuation effects can be a channel for 














































generally will deliver relative price changes that do not have an efficiency 
rationale. The exchange rate may move because of expectations of some 
future change in fundamentals, but those expectations do not reflect any 
current change in the resource costs of producing goods. Additionally, 
some have argued that exchange rates in the short run are influenced by 
investor sentiment, or bubbles, and of course those changes also do not 
reflect underlying true economic costs.
I will say that an exchange rate or a currency is misaligned when the 
exchange rate change, in combination with nominal price stickiness, has 
led relative prices internationally to deviate from the efficient levels that 
represent underlying costs. External balance means the currency is not 
misaligned. This is a notion of external balance that is not arbitrary and 
simply assumed, but rooted in economic logic.
Even if exchange rate changes lead to changes in relative prices that 
are inefficient, it is not necessarily the case that monetary policy should 
target exchange rates as a separate objective beyond its domestic objec-
tives. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000a, 2002) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 
(2002) have developed well-known and influential models, with the im-
plication that currency misalignments should not be a separate goal of 
monetary policy. According to these models, if monetary policy targets 
its familiar internal objectives—inflation and the output gap—then the 
exchange rate will adjust to eliminate any misalignments.
Those papers build simple models that rely on the economic assump-
tion discussed above, that export prices are set in the exporter’s currency 
and adjust only slowly. To recap the example given previously, assume 
European exporters set prices in euros, P E X ,
€ , and American exporters set 
prices in dollars, P U X ,
$







ate with changes in the nominal exchange rate. As Devereux and Engel 
(2006) discuss, when exchange rates are asset prices and subject to fluc-
tuations based on news about future fundamentals, the terms of trade will 
not reflect underlying resource costs of the traded goods. Exchange rate 
fluctuations will affect the relative competitiveness of European compared 
with American producers, and there can be currency misalignments.
But in the simple models of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000a, 2002) and 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002), these misalignments do not require that 
central banks directly target exchange rates. When the dollar depreciates 
relative to the euro, for example, there will be an increase in aggregate 
demand for U.S. goods and a switch in demand away from European 
goods. If the central banks target internal aggregate demand, as reflected 
in producer price inflation and the gap between actual output and its ef-
ficient level (the “output gap”), then the policy is automatically working 
to eliminate the currency misalignment. When aggregate demand returns 
to its optimal or efficient level, the exchange rate will have adjusted back 
into place where it is no longer leading to misalignments in demand for 
U.S. relative to European-produced goods.
In essence, these models are similar to the models of the 1960s—
exchange rates directly affect aggregate demand by affecting import pric-
es—but they dispense with the archaic notion that the exchange rate will 
automatically adjust to achieve external trade balance. Instead, the onus 














































when internal balance is restored, the currency will adjust so it is no lon-
ger determining the relative international competitiveness of producers.
Another strand of the open-economy New Keynesian literature has 
emphasized that currencies can be misaligned even if internal markets 
are in balance. Devereux and Engel (2003), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), 
and Engel (2009), among others, have focused on the role of incomplete 
pass-through of exchange rates to consumer prices. Again, we can recap an 
example given above. Suppose European goods are priced in euros for sale 
in Europe (PE C ,
€ ) and priced in dollars for export sale in the U.S. (PE X ,
$ ).
Then the prices paid by U.S. consumers are not equal to the prices paid 
by European consumers (when the latter are expressed in comparable 
dollar terms, S P E C
$/€
,
€ ). Abstracting from transportation, distribution, and 
marketing costs, these price wedges imply that resources will be distrib-
uted inefficiently. For example, if the dollar is extremely weak (S
$/€is very 
high), then the price paid by Europeans may be high compared with the 





$  may rise to high levels that cannot 
be explained by differences in distribution costs.
This inefficiency does not get reflected in demand for the good in ei-
ther Europe or the U.S. in the short run. As the evidence indicates, prices 
faced by consumers do not vary much in the short run even when exchange 
rate changes are large. How, then, is the inefficiency manifested? Suppose 
the dollar depreciates for reasons unrelated to current economic costs.   





$  rises, so that the price Europeans pay for the European 
good rises relative to the price Americans pay. The European producer 
finds his margin on U.S. sales slipping. The revenue per unit sold in euro 
terms is given by P S E X ,
$/€ /
$ , which falls as the dollar deteriorates. Owners 
of European firms—who are primarily European—will earn less profit, 
and the value of European firms will deteriorate. Conversely, American 
exporters to Europe will gain when the dollar depreciates—each euro in 
sales will be worth more dollars. The relative profitability of the firms, and 
therefore the relative wealth of the firms’ owners, is driven by changes in 
the nominal exchange rate that may have little or nothing to do with the 
productivity or efficiency of those firms. 
It is crucial to recognize that almost all movements in foreign ex-
change rates are inefficient from the criterion of resource allocation. Even 
in the absence of financial market inefficiency—even if financial markets 
are efficient and there are no bubbles—there are essentially no market 
forces to drive the nominal exchange rate toward the level that would re-
flect underlying real costs. The basic market failure is the failure of nomi-
nal prices to adjust to shocks. Nominal exchange rates are determined by 
expectations of the future, as any asset price should be, so they are not 
determined by the current factors that affect the relative competitiveness 
of firms in different countries. The foreign exchange market cannot be 
relied on to somehow magically offset the distortions introduced by sticky 
nominal prices. It is up to policymakers to do their best to combat cur-
rency misalignments (while focusing on their other, perhaps primary, goals 
of inflation and the output gap).
Why do firms not adjust nominal prices? The lost profit for an ex-
porter could be large given the size of exchange rate changes we commonly 














































must confront, though perhaps it is heightened in the international con-
text where the incentives to change prices might be large.
Part of the answer is the standard one given in the Keynesian litera-
ture. There may be costs to adjusting prices. Firms must undertake sub-
stantial research to determine the optimal price that the market will bear 
for their good. Firms update their research only infrequently—quarterly, 
or even annually. The gain in profits from optimal price adjustment in the 
interim may be small. This is particularly true when price setting is not 
synchronized. A firm thinking about resetting its price this week must 
take into account that many other firms are not on the same pricing cycle 
as it is. If the firm finds it is optimal given market conditions to raise its 
price, it must consider that it will lose market share until other firms react 
to conditions and adjust their prices. So the firm only partially adjusts 
its price to current conditions. But then other firms that subsequently set 
their price must take into account that this first firm has not raised its 
price fully. Overlapping pricing cycles can substantially lengthen the price 
adjustment process.
We might consider the market share of a firm as a sort of capital. 
Firms need to advertise to attract customers. The stock of customers is 
costly to acquire, so firms are reluctant to let go of their customers when 
market conditions turn against the firm temporarily. In particular, a tem-
porary change in the exchange rate may hurt the competitive position of 
a firm. But the firm may be willing to suffer lower temporary profits, or 
even losses, to avoid losing its customer base and market share. Drozd and 
Nosal (2008) have demonstrated that firms may change prices very slowly 
and tolerate large differences in prices and profitability across markets 
because of the incentive to retain customers.
Monetary policy should consider these currency misalignments. Engel 
(2009) specifically has shown that the exchange rate is a separate concern 
of policy from its goals of low inflation and low output gaps. 
A considerable literature has shown that monetary policymakers have 
another reason to target the exchange rate—to move the terms of trade in 
their favor.10 For example, the Federal Reserve, if it were acting in compe-
tition with the European Central Bank, might find it optimal to depreciate 
the dollar when there is local currency pricing. Such a policy would benefit 
U.S. producers at the expense of European producers. But the European 
Central Bank would have a similar incentive to depreciate the euro. The 
Nash equilibrium of this policy game would resemble the prisoner’s di-
lemma. Because the objectives of the central banks are competing, their 
efforts on the exchange rate are offsetting. But the efforts devoted to using 
monetary policy to influence the exchange rate distract attention from the 
other goals of the central banks such as inflation. The outcome could be 
improved if central banks cooperate on exchange rate goals.
Indeed, I think it is realistic to describe current central bank policy 
among the richest countries as cooperation on the exchange rate. There is 
an understanding among them that policy will not be used for competi-
10 See Corsetti et al. (2000); Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002); and Benigno and Benigno 
(2003) for analysis of this incentive in the context of noncooperative monetary policy among 
“large” countries. Very similar analysis arises in models of small open economies that have 















































tive devaluations. But the work of Engel (2009), building on the earlier 
research in this area, shows that optimal cooperation does not generally 
take the form of leaving hands off of the exchange rate. Instead, policy-
makers should agree on a target for exchange rates that they would like 
to achieve cooperatively.
It is commonplace to state that a country that fixes the exchange rate 
through monetary policy gives up monetary policy independence. In other 
words, if monetary policy is devoted toward fixing the exchange rate, 
then policy cannot be used to achieve domestic targets on inflation and 
output. The recent open-economy monetary policy literature does not, 
however, favor fixing exchange rates. As Engel (2009) puts it, currency 
misalignment should be one goal of policy along with its other goals on 
inflation and output. There is a trade-off—to the extent that policy pays 
attention to exchange rates, it must give less attention to other goals. The 
importance of the exchange rate target will depend on the degree of mis-
alignment of the currency and the openness of the economies. More open 
economies suffer more from large misalignments.
Experience suggests that any attempt to announce a narrow target 
band for the exchange rate may stimulate speculation, and such a band 
will be difficult to enforce. Instead, central banks should agree on ex-
change rate goals, enunciate those clearly, and also make clear the priority 
of the exchange rate goal relative to inflation and employment targets. In 
that case, I do not see any reason why there should be more speculation 
in the foreign exchange market engendered by the foreign exchange target 
than there is in the inflation-indexed bond market generated by inflation 
targets.
I have consistently used the dollar/euro rate in my examples of cur-
rency misalignment. It is tempting to think that this example is misplaced 
or at least that it shows that exchange rates are a minor concern for 
policymakers. I say that because one might look at the volume of trade 
between the U.S. and Europe, see that it is small relative to the size of 
GDP in each region, and conclude that the size of the problem is small. 
But this is not the right comparison.
First, the size of actual trade is a poor measure of international com-
petition. A better measure requires an assessment of the size of the sectors 
that produce goods that potentially compete on international markets. A 
European firm can be hurt directly by a very weak dollar even if it does 
not export to the U.S. That is because it may be unable to compete in the 
U.S. market precisely because of the misaligned dollar. The firm may be 
efficient enough to overcome the costs of engaging in international trade, 
and so with a correctly aligned currency may be able to compete with U.S. 
firms for the U.S. market. When the dollar is too weak, the firm might not 
even enter the U.S. market.
Second, if the dollar/euro rate is misaligned, then other currencies by 
necessity must be misaligned with either the dollar or the euro or both. 
The renminbi cannot be efficiently priced against both the dollar and the 
euro when the dollar is out of line with the euro. So the amount of trade, 
even potential trade, between the U.S. and Europe is not a sufficient 















































Third, commodities whose prices are determined efficiently and flexi-
bly still cannot achieve the right level in both the U.S. and European mar-
kets if the dollar/euro rate is out of line. As Devereux and Engel (2009) 
state: “Between the last day of March 2002 and the last day of December 
2004, the price of a barrel of crude oil rose from $26.31 to $43.45, a 65.1 
percent increase. This represents a 55.1 percent increase relative to the 
U.S. consumer price index (CPI). Over the same period, the price of a bar-
rel of oil rose from €30.18 to €32.09, a 6.3 percent increase. Relative to the 
French CPI, this was a 0.7 percent increase, and relative to the German 
CPI, a 2.5 percent increase. Apparently, the United States experienced a 
major oil price increase, but Europe did not.”
Of course, the explanation is that the dollar depreciated against the 
euro by 55 percent during this short time period. This depreciation was 
almost all in real terms. It is difficult to imagine an economic theory in 
which markets are efficient and the currency of one major economy can 
depreciate relative to another in real terms by over 50 percent within 
the space of three years—especially when there were no major economic 
shocks that hit the U.S. but not Europe, or vice-versa. Instead, the depre-
ciation must reflect some sort of misalignment. Either the dollar was too 
strong in March 2002, or too weak in December 2004, or both. But the 
consequence of this great depreciation was real—the U.S. suffered an oil 
price shock, and Europe did not.
3. DETERMINING THE TARGET EXCHANGE RATE IN 
ADVANCED COUNTRIES AND EMERGING MARKETS
Conceptually, the object of policy is to achieve an exchange rate level 
such that the competitive positions of firms are not determined by the 
exchange rate, but instead by underlying resource costs. Measuring this 
equilibrium exchange rate is potentially difficult even among similar econ-
omies, such as the major advanced economies. It is even harder to get a 
precise estimate of the equilibrium exchange rate between an emerging 
market and a mature economy.
The problem comes in measuring the resource costs of producing trad-
ed goods. It might seem simple enough to gather data on wages, rents, 
costs of intermediate goods, and other costs for producing traded goods in 
a pair of countries. But it is not. First, we need to measure the efficiency 
of firms. Two different firms may use similar inputs, but one may use them 
more efficiently than another and so will have lower costs. Comparing ef-
ficiency of firms internationally may be a very difficult task. Moreover, the 
comparison of these relative costs may be distorted if the costs themselves 
are subject to nominal stickiness. If U.S. wages are sticky in dollar terms, 
the U.S. costs may be relatively low when the dollar is weak. But that 
cost advantage again does not reflect an efficiency advantage—it is just 
another manifestation of a misaligned currency.
But we can probably get a rough measure of the equilibrium exchange 
rate when comparing similar economies by looking at purchasing power 
parity (PPP) deviations. Deviations from PPP may arise for reasons other 
than currency misalignments, but between comparable economies these 














































Suppose we have measures of consumer prices of traded goods in the 
U.S. and Europe. Those prices may differ because of real cost differences. 
Perhaps firms are more efficient in Europe than in the U.S. If Europeans 
have a home bias in preferences, so they prefer to consume more European 
goods, their overall consumer prices of traded goods should be lower than 
in the U.S. Costs of transportation, distribution, marketing, and retailing 
may differ between Europe and the U.S., which may lead to differences in 
consumer prices based on real costs.
Generally, it is difficult to determine which goods are tradeable and 
which goods have sufficiently high trade costs that they are nontradeable. 
Consumer price levels may differ because of differences in costs of non-
traded goods.
But these factors leading to real differences in price levels—that is, 
leading the efficient level of the real exchange rate to deviate from unity—
are minimized when comparing two similar economies. So a rough measure 
of the equilibrium real exchange rate that policymakers could use is the 
PPP exchange rate, or perhaps a PPP exchange rate for urban areas. 
A PPP exchange rate based on urban area prices would account for the 
differences in underlying costs of consumer goods based on the degree of 
urbanization. Generally, urban areas have higher living costs due primar-
ily to higher housing costs.
It is much more difficult to use this sort of back-of-the-envelope calcu-
lation to arrive at an equilibrium real exchange rate when comparing an 
emerging market economy to an advanced economy. It is well known that 
nontraded goods prices tend to be lower in countries with lower incomes. 
A number of plausible theories have been advanced to explain this phe-
nomenon, and it is reasonable to assume that such pricing represents an 
efficient market outcome.
But how then can we measure the efficient level of the real exchange 
rate? We do not want to use the PPP real exchange rate, because the 
poorer country ought to have lower prices (a weaker real exchange rate) 
than the richer country.  Nobody should contend that the equilibrium 
value of the renminbi is the one that achieves purchasing power parity 
with the dollar.
Instead, we might try to make adjustments based on the relative in-
comes of countries. But how much weaker should the real value of the cur-
rency be in a poor country relative to a richer country? The approach tak-
en by Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2007) seems like a reasonable one. They 
look at a broad cross section of countries. They reason (or, more precisely, 
they assume) that, on average, real exchange rates relative to the U.S. are 
at the efficient level. Some may be overvalued and some undervalued, but 
on average they are just right. We can then look at the average effect of 
relative income on real exchange rates to gauge the appropriate degree by 
which we should adjust the PPP real exchange rate to get our measure of 
the equilibrium rate.
Unfortunately, this approach has a significant difficulty because it re-
quires comparing levels of real income between countries. That exercise in 
itself requires some comparison of prices, because we need to measure the 
real value of output in the nontraded sector. This problem is illustrated in 














































in Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2007) with the calculation in Cheung, Chinn, 
and Fujii (2009). The earlier paper does find evidence that the renminbi 
is undervalued, though it emphasizes that the measure of the equilibrium 
exchange rate is imprecise so that they cannot conclude with statistical 
certainty that there is undervaluation. But the second paper uses new, re-
vised measures of the real income of China. The new measures lowered the 
assessment of the level of real income in China. But lower income means 
that the equilibrium value of the renminbi should be lower. Using the new 
measures of Chinese income, Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2009) conclude 
that there is no evidence of undervaluation of the renminbi.
4. FIXED EXCHANGE RATES AND CREDIBILITY
The modern literature on monetary policy has emphasized the gains 
from credibly committing to a monetary policy rule. The question facing 
many emerging market is how does monetary policy establish credibility?
The modern literature does not have a clear-cut answer to that. One 
important ingredient is central bank independence. If central banks are 
subject to political pressure, they may be tempted to follow policies that 
are too activist. But policies that respond too aggressively when there 
is unemployment or declining output will build in expectations of a bias 
toward expansionary policy. Those expectations have a cost. When policy-
makers need to disinflate, they must battle these expectations. They will 
have to increase real interest rates more and dampen aggregate demand to 
a greater degree to achieve a given amount of disinflation than they would 
if they were perceived as being committed to a policy rule. Optimal policy 
rules need not have inflation alone as their target, but the rules must be 
verifiable to be credible.
Some economists, and indeed some central bankers, have concluded 
that fixing the exchange rate is one way to achieve credibility quickly. The 
exchange rate is a very visible price—very easy to verify. A policy that 
commits to fixing the exchange rate will be viewed as a clear abandonment 
of discretionary policy. Clerc, Dellas, and Loisel (2008) provide an analysis 
of this view in the context of the modern Keynesian approach.
A currency board is the cleanest example of a fixed exchange rate. 
The experience of Hong Kong and Argentina with currency boards also 
provides some lessons on the benefits and the limitations of a fixed ex-
change rate policy.
First, as we have already mentioned, if monetary policy is commit-
ted to fixing the exchange rate, then policy cannot have separate goals of 
keeping inflation low or maintaining full employment. To be sure, gener-
ally the goals of a stable currency, low inflation, and full employment 
may coincide. To maintain a fixed exchange rate, money growth must be 
restrained. Argentina, after adopting the currency board, experienced a 
dramatic drop in inflation. And a stable policy environment imposed in a 
previously inflationary setting will also tend to increase certainty about 
economic relationships and will lead to stronger real economic growth. 
Again, the initial years of the Argentine experience, as well as the entire 
history of the Hong Kong experience with a currency board, tend to lend 














































But there are possibilities of a trade-off. A country that has a fixed 
exchange  rate  can  achieve  a  real  appreciation  only  through  inflation. 
Sometimes economic circumstances require a change in the real exchange 
rate, and that change can occur only through changes in the nominal 
price level. So while we have argued that the exchange rate should be an 
objective of central bank policy, in general there is a trade-off between 
the exchange rate objective and the inflation and output objectives. The 
choice to give up independent influence on inflation and the output gap by 
adopting a currency board can be supported only if the gains in credibility 
for policymaking are sufficiently large.
Finally, it perhaps goes without saying that adopting a fixed exchange 
rate cannot raise credibility of policy indefinitely if, in fact, policies are be-
ing implemented that are ultimately incompatible with the fixed exchange 
rate. Here, again, the experience of Argentina comes to mind.
5. STERILIZED INTERVENTION
The analysis of exchange rate policy up until now has been predicated 
on the idea that the exchange rate is one target of monetary policy. Steril-
ized intervention offers the possibility of separating exchange rate policy 
from monetary policy. Here I will offer only some brief observations about 
sterilized intervention. There is very little analysis of sterilized interven-
tion in the new Keynesian framework. Instead, my comments are primar-
ily based on empirical evidence and observation. 
The first point is that sterilized intervention appears to be effective 
only when the country has capital controls in place or the country’s exter-
nal capital markets are thin. In these cases, the central bank can be a large 
player in the market for its own currency. It is able to support its currency 
essentially by drying up the supply of its currency in world markets by 
selling off its foreign exchange reserves. If capital markets were deep, then 
the private capital market could “undo” any effect of sterilized interven-
tion. Suppose, for example, that a central bank wants to keep its currency 
from depreciating. It sells off reserves (for example, of dollar assets) and 
buys its own currency. But when capital markets are deep, private specu-
lators can reverse the effects of this action. If the market believes that the 
central bank’s target ultimately overvalues the currency, speculators may 
be willing to sell very large amounts of the currency without changing 
their assessment of its market value.
The empirical literature on the effects of sterilized intervention faces 
a significant difficulty of endogeneity. Intervention usually only occurs in 
response to changes in the value of the currency driven by market forces. 
For example, the market might perceive that the currency should depre-
ciate, and the central bank responds with intervention to strengthen the 
currency. The empirical researcher will be confronted with data that show 
the central bank intervening to support the currency, but the currency 
is depreciating. It is almost impossible to separate out the effects of the 
private market from the effects of the central bank action.
Typically, econometric studies deal with simultaneous causality by us-
ing instrumental variable techniques. In this case, in order to measure the 
effects of intervention, researchers would need to find a variable that influ-
ences exchange rates but does not influence the amount of intervention. It 














































are few, if any, empirical studies that have successfully used this approach 
to assess the effects of sterilized intervention. One well-known paper by 
Kearns and Rigobon (2005) uses a technical econometric technique involv-
ing restrictions on correlations to identify the effects of intervention on 
exchange rates. They find that large interventions in exchange markets 
with deep capital markets have only small effects on the exchange rate: 
The equivalent of a US$100 million intervention in the market for Austra-
lian dollars moves the exchange rate by about 1.5 percent on the day of 
the intervention, with the effect receding over time, while in the market 
for the Japanese yen an equivalent intervention leads to only a 0.2 percent 
effect on exchange rates.
One tack that a number of research studies have taken recently is to 
examine very high frequency intra-daily data on interventions and ex-
change rates. The idea is that if we examine the behavior of foreign ex-
change markets at five-minute intervals (for example), we can directly 
measure the effects of intervention in the five minutes immediately after 
the central bank enters the market. This type of analysis has two obvious 
limitations: First, it can only separate out the exogenous effects of inter-
vention over a very short horizon. Second, it still relies on an assumption 
that the effect of the intervention can be separated out from the effects 
of market purchases over the short time interval. Even with these as-
sumptions, the studies tend to find little effect of sterilized intervention in 
currencies with deep capital markets. For example, Fatum and Pedersen 
(2009) find that intervention by the Danish central bank can influence 
the value of the krone/euro rate, but only when the intervention policy is 
consistent with underlying Danish monetary policy. Other studies, such as 
Dominguez (2006) and Fatum and Hutchison (2006), find that sterilized 
intervention can have an influence on exchange rates, but only for short 
periods (less than one month.)
On the other hand, clearly some countries such as China are able to 
influence exchange rates while effectively largely sterilizing the effects of 
intervention on the money supply or monetary conditions. The effective-
ness of this intervention is generally believed to be attributable to restric-
tions on capital flows.
While restricting flows of capital is clearly a case of government inter-
vention in the free operation of markets, there is by now a large literature 
that supports the case for capital controls in emerging markets. Some of 
the literature makes a theoretical case. For example, Rodrik (1998, 1999) 
and Obstfeld (2008) argue that without well-functioning economic, social 
and legal institutions, opening international capital markets may be coun-
terproductive. Empirical studies (such as Klein and Olivei 2008 and Chinn 
and Ito 2007) support the view that capital market liberalization does not 
lead to better economic performance in the absence of internal reforms. In 
other words, a country in the midst of economic liberalization should first 
focus on internal liberalization before opening capital markets.
Because sterilized intervention can be effective where capital controls 
are in place, such countries enjoy a sort of policymaking luxury. They 
can conduct exchange rate policy with some independence from monetary 
policy. These countries have effectively two policy instruments—sterilized 
intervention and the monetary policy instrument (money growth or inter-














































lose the option of using sterilized intervention. Very little research has 
been conducted on the value of this option. 
However, that option comes with a price. One benefit of controlling 
exchange rates with monetary policy, as has already been argued, is that 
such a policy may quickly gain credibility for the central bank. Central 
banks that fix exchange rates clearly are not following discretionary po-
lices with an inflationary bias. It is difficult to imagine how monetary 
policy alone can fix the exchange rate, except when a currency board is 
established (or a country joins a currency union). But to the extent that 
policymakers rely on sterilized intervention to control exchange rates, the 
exchange rate policy contributes less to the credibility of monetary policy. 
If exchange rate policy and monetary policy are seen as separate tools, 
then evidence of the former may tell markets very little about the latter.
Even under sterilized intervention, there surely is some signal about 
policy commitment when a country maintains a fixed exchange rate. Al-
though I cannot cite empirical evidence to support this, I do believe that 
international markets increased their confidence in the stability of Chinese 
economic policy because China maintained a fixed exchange rate during 
many difficult years, including the Asian crisis. 
Moreover, it is difficult to maintain a fixed exchange rate with steril-
ized intervention if there is a big discrepancy between the goals of mon-
etary policy and exchange rate intervention. Suppose there are no un-
derlying reasons for a real appreciation in a country, but it maintains a 
fixed exchange rate in combination with an inflationary monetary policy. 
Eventually the overvaluation of the currency will lead to disequilibria in 
goods and financial markets that are undesirable.
The converse problem also arises—a country can use monetary pol-
icy and exchange rate policy separately to gain a competitive advantage 
through devaluation. The country can devalue its currency in nominal 
terms but use monetary policy to control inflation. This type of policy 
will cut off the channels for real price adjustment. China has, of course, 
been accused of essentially running such a policy. However, in China’s 
case, there was no devaluation of the currency in nominal terms. Instead, 
the argument goes, China should have allowed a real appreciation, but by 
fixing its nominal exchange rate and dampening inflation, it prevented the 
real appreciation from occurring. Even if this accusation is untrue (recall, 
Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii 2009 find little evidence the renminbi is overval-
ued), it is difficult to refute the charges.
6. CURRENCY RESERVES
To conduct sterilized intervention, central banks acquire foreign ex-
change reserves. The management of these reserves is the subject of an 
intense ongoing debate. I will stay out of that debate, given that it is 
straying too far from the central topic of this paper. I will limit myself to 
three observations.
First, many commentators and researchers argued—before the cri-
sis—that accumulation of reserves by central banks was wasteful and ill-
advised. It was said that central banks accumulated far more reserves 














































reserves earned low rates of return compared with other investment op-
portunities.
Since the crisis, opinions have changed. It turns out that, on the 
whole, countries with a large war chest of reserves weathered the crisis 
relatively well—better than countries with low levels of reserves.11 Obst-
feld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2008) reassess the stock of reserves needed 
to defend a currency. When the central bank is the lender of last resort, it 
may be required to have a very large war chest of reserves to defend the 
currency. To prevent a run on banks and subsequent flight to foreign cur-
rency, the central bank holds reserves. Its potential liabilities include the 
bank deposits that could be converted to foreign currency. By maintaining 
a large stock of foreign exchange reserves, the central bank signals that it 
will be able to defend the currency, and it can therefore discourage a bank 
run from occurring in the first place.
Another point to be made is that the return to the portfolios of cen-
tral banks that held U.S. Treasury bonds has been relatively very strong. 
It turns out that other assets were risky—probably riskier than the mar-
ket perceived—and it was the wise investor that held a portfolio heavily 
weighted toward Treasuries. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, the 
dollar appreciated (from $1.60/€ to $1.25/€, before weakening again to 
around $1.42/€ at the time this paper is being written). And the dollar 
value of Treasury bonds rose while equity markets crashed. 
Clearly, now central banks are worried about the value of their dollar 
assets falling. But they are looking at things from the top of the mountain. 
The performance of their portfolios has been very strong, and they are 
worried about underperformance in the future. That is still a much better 
position to be in than if the reserves had been largely invested in equities 
or even nondollar currencies. Then emerging market central banks would 
be like the rest of us—at the bottom hoping things improve.
The second point I want to make is that there is, of course, something 
very different about this crisis from other recent financial crises. In emerg-
ing market crises, the crisis countries had accumulated debt denominated 
in foreign currency (U.S. dollars, mainly). The crises led to steep deprecia-
tions of their currencies and an increase in the value of their external debt 
in units of their own currency.
On the other hand, the recent crisis, which had its epicenter in the 
U.S., led to an appreciation of the dollar. But the U.S. had also borrowed 
primarily in dollar terms, so the appreciation did not reduce the external 
value of its debt in terms of dollars. The crisis was clearly unusual because 
the currency of the crisis country appreciated. The emerging markets, 
which largely did not suffer from the underlying distortions in financial 
markets that are now evident in large financial centers, nonetheless needed 
foreign currency reserves to defend their own currency. The simple story 
for the appreciation of the dollar was that there was hoarding of dollar 
assets. Banks and other financial institutions, especially, needed to protect 
their balance sheets. Dollar liquidity dried up, creating an excess demand 
for dollars, driving up its price.















































My point here is that, at least in this case, central banks did not 
need a pot of reserves to protect their own weakened currency. Instead, 
they needed specifically dollar reserves in order to protect their currencies 
against this peculiar dollar drought. Other forms of reserves—euros or 
SDRs—probably would not have been as useful during this crisis.
The third and final point I will make on reserves is that the currency 
swaps offered by the Federal Reserve during the current crisis have altered 
the picture. Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2009) demonstrate that 
in cases where central banks did not hold large dollar reserves, the avail-
ability of the swap lines apparently had a significant effect in stabilizing 
exchange rates. On the other hand, many Asian countries already held 
large and adequate war chests of reserves, so the availability of the swap 
line was more symbolic.
The role that these swap lines played does demonstrate the impor-
tance of having access to a large store of reserves. It may also demonstrate 
that there is less need to hold reserves if the swap lines are available. 
However, Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2009) make two observa-
tions. First, the scale of the lending to central banks that was necessary in 
this crisis was so large that it is difficult to imagine any other institution 
providing such a large supply of dollars save for the institution that can 
create that currency—the Federal Reserve. These authors note that some 
central banks, such as China’s, do have very large holdings of reserves, 
but it would take an extraordinary commitment for these banks to lend 
their reserves in a crisis. For example, the size of the swap lines envisioned 
under the Chang Mai initiative may need to be reassessed in light of the 
experience in the recent crisis. Second, this was an extraordinary event. 
We have no way of knowing whether the Fed would be willing to create 
such enormous swap lines in the future.12 
7. CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusion of this paper is that there is a case for policy to 
stabilize exchange rates. Large fluctuations in exchange rates—even if they 
are not “excessive” fluctuations due to market sentiment or bubbles—can 
lead to inefficient allocation of resources. Unperturbed free markets in for-
eign exchange cannot be relied upon to arrive at exchange rate levels that 
deliver terms of trade and real exchange rates that reflect the underlying 
economic productivity, efficiency, and competitiveness of economies.
Probably the main case for freely floating exchange rates is a political 
one: Policymakers cannot be relied on to intervene in foreign exchange 
markets in a benign way. From a selfish standpoint, each country may 
have an incentive to devalue to gain a competitive edge. The competi-
tive devaluations of the Great Depression loom large in the memories of 
many economists and policymakers. I conclude that some effort to control 
exchange rate fluctuations is desirable, but that it is best achieved in the 
context of cooperation among policymakers.
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